This paper develops a theoretical framework in which patents and control of downstream cospecialized assets affect the way firms profit from innovation according to the stage of industry evolution. We argue that in early stages of industry life cycle the effectiveness of patents in protecting innovations or in enhancing their visibility encourages technology licensing, while ownership of downstream assets helps launch new products. We test these ideas in the Security Software Industry, which arose about 20 years ago, and exhibits the typical features of an early stage industry. Moreover, SSI patents are an effective means for technological protection and for visibility. We employ panel data on 87 firms with patents in key SSI technologies during 1993-2000. After controlling for firm size, age, and R&D intensity, we find evidence consistent with our predictions.
Introduction
Firms that want to profit from innovation face two strategies: selling the technology to another party or embedding it in final products. While integration in products is the classical form of commercial exploitation of innovation, technology trade has gained importance (Arora and Gambardella 1994; Gans and Stern 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006) . In his seminal work, Teece (1986) highlights the pivotal factors in this decision: Control of downstream cospecialized assets and degree of Intellectual Propriety Right (IPR) protection (see also McGahan and Silverman, 2006) . The underlying theoretical argument is that if a firm owns the downstream assets, it will embed innovation in final products. If not, and these assets are costly to acquire, it may find it more profitable to sell the innovation. In this case, IPRs are important, as technology deals are affected by transaction costs that are lowered by well-defined IPRs (Arora et al. 2001) . Recent case studies call for a fine-tuning of this theory. Sometimes established firms with downstream assets sell their technologies (Arora et al. 2001) ; young startups with scarce marketing and production assets exploit their innovations with final products (Giarratana 2004) ; quite a few firms both sell and use their technologies internally (Ammon and Laursen 2006) . This paper argues that what matters is not only the firm control of downstream assets, but also how fragmented these assets are in the industry, where more fragmentation means more sub-market niches and less direct firm competition. Since industry structure typically changes over the industry life cycle, this means that downstream assets can play a different role according to the stage of industry evolution (Klepper 2002; Klepper and Thomspon 2007) . With respect to IPRs, the literature has stressed the importance of patents in protecting technology suppliers (e.g. Arora et al. 2001 , Gans et al. 2002 , Arora and Merges 2004 . We also highlight their role in lowering the search costs of potential technology buyers. Thus, in our view, welldefined IPRs reduce transaction costs in technology trade for both the buyer and the supplier.
We summarize our theoretical framework in four industry scenarios, according to the high-low importance of IPRs and fragmentation of downstream assets. Each scenario predicts the impacts of the two factors on the firm propensity to exploit innovation through final products or technology licensing.
Specifically, we are interested in testing the theoretical implications of the scenario in which IPRs are relatively well-defined and downstream assets are fragmented. This is because, according to our theory, this is the scenario in which a firm holding a new technology faces a choice between licensing and developing the product. As we shall see, when IPRs are weak firms integrate, and when IPRs are strong but downstream assets are homogenous licensing either occurs because of pre-existing vertical specialization (i.e. not explained by our strategic choices) or it does not occur. Also, this scenario depicts the case of technology-based nascent industries. In these industries downstream assets are fragmented because a dominant design has not yet emerged, and we study the implications of well-defined IPRs.
We look at the Security Software Industry (SSI), which is an ideal test-bed for the scenario that we want to study: i) it is a recent technology-based industry with many sub-market niches in which innovation plays a major role; ii) IPRs are well-defined, and firms usually patent their new software algorithms, which are the core of a software security system; iii) the industry exhibits significant entry and exit, with little sign of consolidation around a few large players; and iv) firms tend to profit both through product releases and technology licensing (Fosfuri and Giarratana 2007) . By drawing on a sample of 87 firms with patents in key SSI technologies, we predict the probabilities that a firm sells its technology or launches a new SSI product using 1993-2000 panel data. To our knowledge, only Gans et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence of the simultaneous determinants of firm choice to sell the technology or to go downstream in the final market. They employ survey data on 118 start-ups that have received a public or private grant. From an empirical perspective, our study makes two improvements.
First, we do not pre-determine the firm types that license or develop products, viz. we use a sample of both small and large firms. Second, the industry exhibits a clear distinction between cryptography technology and final product market. This reduces the ambiguity between products and technologies, and therefore between licensing and product strategies.
One of the most relevant empirical results of our analysis is that patents encourage technology trade. They favor the probability of selling the firm technology, and we discuss why they capture something more than innovation in our regressions, particularly lower transaction costs from both the demand and the supply-side of technology. We also find that downstream assets are the main drivers of the firm propensity to release an SSI product. Finally, patents do not produce a clear-cut effect on the propensity to release a product, and downstream assets do not affect the probability of selling the technology.
The next section discusses our theoretical background. Section 3 describes the major features of SSI. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence, and Section 5 discusses our results.
The final section concludes.
Theoretical background
Firms that control downstream assets tend to embody their innovations in final products. There are many reasons. First, such assets, once in place, need to be fed with production and commercialization activities to avoid under-utilization. Second, patents, secrecy, and other means can be used to block or delay imitation, thereby reinforcing the ability of companies to exploit the innovation commercially. Third, as shown by Arora and Fosfuri (2003) in a theoretical model, and by Fosfuri (2007) empirically, the threat that technology buyers could compete with the licensor discourages technology producers with downstream assets to trade their technologies. All this suggests that firms with downstream assets rarely sell their innovation rights. Typically they license if this does not erode their market share, as for example when the potential technology buyer operates in a distant market, whether geographically (e.g. international licensing) or technologically (e.g. the technology is used in distant product applications). By a symmetric argument, the lack of downstream assets, and the cost of acquiring them, favor technology licensing, as shown by the fact that this is the way in which many innovative young entrepreneurial firms profit from their innovations in markets controlled by established incumbents (Gans and Stern 2003) .
In spite of these theoretical predictions, Gans et al. (2002) do not find any robust effect of downstream assets on the propensity of start-ups to sell their technology, and Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) show that the firm downstream assets do not produce an effect per se, but only mediated through the effectiveness of patents. By contrast, Fosfuri (2007) finds a significant negative effect of downstream assets on the probability of licensing chemical compounds for a sample of large petrochemical firms. Similarly, McGahan and Silverman (2006) find the in industries in which downstream complementary assets are important, relevant innovations (measured by patent citations) by "outsiders" -i.e. firms or institutions that do not compete with the focal firm -have a positive impact on its financial value. This suggests that the control of complementary assets forces the outsiders to develop alliances or licensing agreements with the incumbents. This mixed evidence can be explained. The fragmentation of downstream assets changes across industries and along the stages of an industry evolution (Teece 1986 ). In the computer industry, Bresnahan and Greenstein (1997) According to the "industry life cycle" tradition (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Klepper 2002) , fragmentation of downstream assets is typical of the initial period of an industry's development, which also features intensive entry and exit of firms. Then, industries undergo a "shake-out" phase, which leads to product standardization, fewer sub-market niches and higher concentration (see also McGahan and Silverman 2001) . Klepper and Thompson (2007) explain the pre-shake-out pattern with the tendency of some industries to generate continuous proliferation of new sub-market niches that make the standardization of downstream co-specialized assets difficult. A common interpretation is that the proliferation of sub-market niches emerges when industries become markets of general purpose technology and products (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995 At the same time, technology trade is bound by transaction costs. This stems largely from the intangible nature of knowledge goods that makes the object of transaction ill-defined.
Asymmetric information or other contractual ambiguities then curb technology trade. As a matter of fact, Arora and Gambardella (1994) argue that technology markets are more likely to arise when technologies are more codified, and take the form of well-defined objects like codes, algorithms, genes; however, the codification of technology is not sufficient for technology trade.
On the supply side, we know since Arrow's (1962) work that information can be reproduced easily, and this can destroy the rents of its original producer if it is not protected by property rights. A growing literature has then noted that patents enhance technology markets because they confer a property right to the technology producer (e.g. Gans et al. 2002; Arora and Fosfuri 2003; Arora and Merges 2004) . On the demand side, another well-known feature of patents is that they disclose information about the innovation. Today, with on-line databases and the great attention paid by market players to patents, there is a great diffusion of information about them, which reduces the search costs of technology buyers. Interestingly, codification helps both sides. The effectiveness of patents is higher when the technology is codified because there are fewer ambiguities about what is protected. At the same time, codified technologies can be understood fairly well just from the patent documents. Their diffusion can then be enough to boost the visibility of the innovation. The recent empirical evidence confirms that patents favor technology licensing, even though it does not establish whether patents reduce transaction costs from the point of view of the buyer or the supplier (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Gambardella et al. 2006 ).
1
To summarize this discussion, below we define four scenarios according to the importance of patents in an industry (high-low) and the fragmentation of downstream cospecialized assets (high-low). In the four scenarios, we predict the effect that patents and downstream assets have on the propensity of firms to profit from its innovation through technology licensing or final products. The four scenarios are also synthesized in Table 1 .
[ firms and large incumbents (e.g. biotechnology). In the a) case, firm investments in patents should have a moderate or null effect on the probability of licensing and a positive one on the probability of releasing a product since firms with downstream assets need inventions and protection to exploit business opportunities. Downstream assets should have a positive effect on the firm propensity to release a product and a negative or null effect on licensing. In the b) case, firm patents ought to have a positive effect on the probability of licensing only in the case of firms without downstream assets, and a limited or null effect on the probability of releasing a product since firms without downstream assets cannot enter the downstream market.
Downstream assets should affect negatively the probability of licensing because there are concerns about market share cannibalization. However, they should positively affect the release of products. 
The Security Software Industry

Background
SSI is one of the newest segments of the software industry. So far, it is a good example of a noshake-out industry (Giarratana 2004) . SSI has experienced an unprecedented growth in recent years. While it started around the end of the 1980s, the SSI world market reached USD8. SSI has also experienced an intense proliferation of sub-market niches. They range from basic security software, such as Virtual Private Networks, Firewall and Virus Scanning, to advanced security services like Public Key Infrastructures, Security Certification, and Penetration Testing. Table 2 shows the SSI major product niches that have arisen in fewer than 15 years of industry history using a six digit SIC code classification.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Algorithms, patents and licensing
The design of security software products is a complex undertaking. The technological core of the product is the crypto-algorithm, which specifies the mathematical transformations that are performed on the data. Speed of mathematical calculations and security level are the two main features by which SSI products are evaluated. This is because the time consumed by the encryption and decryption processes depends on the length of mathematical algorithms and the power of computing machines (Giarratana 2004) . A good algorithm aims at minimizing the computer time needed to perform data transformation under a security level threshold.
The crypto-algorithm is the principal object of a firm patent. Patenting of the cryptoalgorithm has been encouraged by the loosening restrictions of the US Patent Office on software patenting. Usually, SSI patents include flow charts reporting step-by-step the encryptiondecryption routines and the detailed description of all the mathematical procedures that perform the encryption. Moreover, there are tests on the level of security and the speed of the process.
The crypto-algorithm is a classical example of a codified technology. For example, one of the most important crypto-algorithms is the Elliptic Curve Cryptography patented by Certicom (US Patent number 6,141,420). This algorithm needs only 160 computer bits to perform all the procedures while the standard string needs about 1,024 bits. This is because while the standard systems are based on integer calculus, the Certicom algorithm is based on elliptic curves that can be calculated more easily and faster while providing the same level of security. Yet, this also means that if unprotected, the technology is not hard to imitate, as it is clearly defined in mathematical and software language, i.e. it is expressed in a well-defined code. For the very same reasons, the patent defines clearly the object of what is protected, which reduces potential ambiguities about it, and then raises the effectiveness of protection. Finally, the codified nature of the algorithm and of its functions implies that the disclosure of information provided by the patent raises its visibility, as potential users can rapidly verify its structure and utilization.
We confirmed the importance of the protection and visibility role of patents in SSI from interviews with managers in four firms that have sold algorithms. We found the following: First, patents are a good way of protecting the algorithms. Patents are necessary, because algorithms tend to devaluate quickly. The interviewees told us that patents produce a lead time advantage of no more than two years. Second, firms patent without a well-planned ex-ante strategy of selling the technology. Our four firms were approached by future technology buyers who had studied their technology and were interested in utilizing it in their product developments. This is suggestive of the fact that the technology markets in SSI is in good part demand-driven, which in turn raises the importance of the visibility function of patents. Our interviewees also suggested that firms in SSI sell technology to gain reputation or to open up new markets, even if the licensing revenues are quite sizeable.
The foregoing remarks make SSI an ideal example of a market for both products (Firewall, Anti-virus, etc.) and technology. This is confirmed by Hoovers data (www.hoovers.com), which classified the 2002 SSI revenues in sales of software products (52.3 %), services (30.3 %) and revenues from licensing the technological algorithms (17.4 %).
Moreover, our understanding of the industry is that, after a licensing deal, the licensee uses the acquired technology either to create and improve a new algorithm or to embed it in its software products. This highlights the high codification of the underlying technologies, as the algorithms can be readily embedded in new systems, whether new algorithms or products, without any major modifications of the technology itself or the system in which it is embedded. Two 
Empirical Evidence
The sample
Since we aim at studying the behaviour of firms holding a SSI innovation, our sample is composed of all the firms with at least one software patent granted in technological classes that are strategic for SSI (SSI Patents, hereafter). As previously discussed, in SSI patents are effective, and therefore companies patent their algorithms frequently. 
Methodology and dependent variables
We run two logit regressions to estimate the probability that, in each year, the firm releases a new SSI product or signs a licensing contract as a technology seller. The first dependent variable is LICENSE which takes the value 1 if in the corresponding year the firm announces at least one licensing deal as an algorithm seller, and 0 otherwise. The second dependent variable is PRODUCT which takes the value 1 if in the corresponding year the firm announces the release of at least one new SSI product, and 0 otherwise. Of our 87 firms, 44 launched at least one new SSI product, and 36 signed at least one licensing contract as a seller. We run a logit for whether products were released or licenses were issued rather than the number of products or licenses because we are not interested in the scale of licensing or new product introduction but in the licensing vs. product strategy. Our dummy for licensing or product is a better measure of the intentions of the firms.
Independent variables
Patents. For each firm-year, we calculate the stock of SSI patents (PATENT), that is the cumulative sum of all the SSI patents up to that year. As a robustness check, we introduce two alternative patent stock variables using an annual discount factor of 10% and 15% respectively (PATENT10 and PATENT15). These covariates proxy for the firm propensity to invest in patenting the cryptology invention. We use stock measures to better capture potential learning and knowledge base effects.
There are two important remarks about the use of patents in our regressions. The first one is that our goal is not to study patents as a measure of innovation, but as factors that encourage licensing or the development of new products. Since data on the number of firm innovations are difficult to obtain, we have to resort to other controls (i.e. firm-level R&D, size and age). However, since they are imperfect measures of the number of innovations, patents could still proxy for them. Our claim is that patents will be also correlated with other aspects as well, particularly protection and visibility.
This leads to our second point. We do not make any claim on the origin of different patent propensities. Because we have firm-level data, we need patents to capture differences across firms, or at least over time for the same firm. Firms could show differences in the propensity to patent, which could stem from different sources. For example, some firms may have internal legal offices that reduce the marginal cost of patenting, or simply greater experience. Another important source of inter-firm differences is the IPRs managerial ability.
Some firms simply perceive the advantages of patents better than others, and therefore patent more, e.g. to better protect around an innovation. Finally, good algorithms span more applications, which lead to more patents. While this may also reflect differences in quality, a larger number of patents produce greater protection and visibility in any case, and therefore capture some of the aspects that we want to account for.
Downstream Assets. Previous studies on licensing measure downstream assets with
direct survey responses on the importance of downstream complementary assets (Gans et al. 2002) , with a dummy that captures if the R&D and production personnel interact (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006) , and with the firm market share in a particular market segment (Fosfuri 2007 ).
These indirect measures suggest that the use of real measures of downstream assets has proven to be surprisingly difficult. We try to improve on this matter by jointly employing two standard accounting measures like sales and fixed assets along with a natural proxy of downstream assets like the firm trademarks. We construct two time-variant variables that we use alternatively to proxy for downstream assets in software: the share of the live software trademarks on the total firm trademark multiplied by firm fixed assets (ASSETS1), and the share of the live software trademarks on the total firm trademarks multiplied by firm size in sales (ASSETS2). We are basically using the share of software trademarks to denote the proportion of firm total sales or fixed assets associated to software. We use both sales and firm fixed assets for robustness purposes.
Trademarks are combinations of "words, phrases, symbols or designs that identify and distinguish the source of the goods or services" (USPTO Documentation, http://tess.uspto.gov).
US trademark owners pay different types of fees for each class of goods/services for which a trademark is registered, and they have to prove periodically that they are using the trademark in the US market. Otherwise -even if the owner is willing to pay the fees -the trademark is cancelled. A trademark protects a new logo on a product or a new advertising and branding campaign. Moreover, software trademarks are not a recent phenomenon like software patents.
For example, the first software trademark was granted in 1967 to the firm Medelco, and
Microsoft has registered up to date more than 1,700 software trademarks, the first one in 1982.
Therefore, the trademarks are an excellent proxy for the "stock" of firm downstream assets in a particular market segment, which is difficult to obtain from more conventional accounting measures, also because if the trademarks are not commercialized they cannot be renewed. The empirical literature on trademarks has emerged only recently. Previous studies have shown that trademarks are a good proxy of the products/markets in which a firm operates and their level of product advertising. For example, Seethamraju (2003) and Smith and Parr (2000) show that trademarks are highly correlated with firm sales and stock market value.
In our study, for each firm-year, we calculated the share of software trademarks registered and "live" at USPTO by our sample firms over the total live firm trademarks. In so doing, for our sample firms, we downloaded trademarks data from the USPTO database available at http://tess.uspto.gov. In order to distinguish the software trademarks, we apply a search algorithm (["computer software" or "operating system" or "computer program" or "software algorithm" or "data processing" or "software application"]), to the front page of the trademark in the description of Good and Service trademarked. can be interpreted as proxies for a firm scale and experience, R&D plays a more important role.
As noted, since we want to check the effect of the firm patents on the probability of licensing,
and not of the patents as pure measures of the firm innovations, we need R&D to control for the latter. To our knowledge, the only empirical evidence available that predicts the licensing propensity using both patent and R&D is Fosfuri (2007) Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analysis. Table 4 and 5 show the results for the probability of licensing and product releases. We present 6 different models (Model 1-6) using the three patent specifications (PATENT, PATENT10, and PATENT15) and the two proxies for the downstream assets (ASSET1 and ASSET2). All the controls are always included as covariates.
Estimation results
[TABLES 3, 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE]
The three patent stock specifications lead to similar results in all models. Patents have an important positive effect on the probability of licensing an algorithm, but no effect on the probability of releasing an SSI product. In a standard experiment, in Model 1, a standard deviation increase from the mean in PATENT increases the probability of selling an algorithm by 34.1%. Our trademark-based proxies for downstream assets exhibit a symmetric pattern. They have no effect on the probability of licensing but a positive and significant effect on the probability of releasing an SSI product. A standard deviation increase from the mean in ASSET1
increases the probability of launching a new product by 12.4% (Model 1).
As far as our controls are concerned, size and age have a negative effect on the probability of licensing. Old and large firms are less likely to be technology sellers of this industry, which strengthens the classical framework whereby it is the small and new innovative start-ups that typically act as technology suppliers. As expected, R&D intensity has a positive and significant impact on the probability of licensing. We then obtain an effect of patents on the probability of licensing after controlling for R&D.
In the product equation, age is significant with a negative sign. SSI is then a young industry dominated by young firms on the product side as well. Note that size does not affect the probability of releasing products, a result that might have been expected in the software industry where scale economies play a rather marginal role. R&D-intensity is again important.
Apart from being more likely to license, more R&D-intensive firms are also more likely to introduce a new SSI product. In this respect, R&D probably captures a good deal of the innovation effect. Our interpretation is that in order to release an SSI product a firm needs some downstream assets and an innovation, but patents per sè do not play a pivotal role for launching a new product.
Robustness checks
We first check that the licensing and product decisions are not correlated. This implies no loss in estimation efficiency by estimating (1) and (2) at the pre-sample period (1992), results, which are available on request, did not change.
Our most important check, however, is that our results are robust to the use of a different sampling method. We built a control sample of firms without SSI patents. From the LECG-Corptech database we selected all the firms with business activity in SSI that are not included in our initial sample. 5 This produced a control sample of 79 firms that have some business activity -product or services -in SSI. We do not know whether these firms have produced an innovation, even though we know that they have not produced a patented innovation. After collecting all the required variables, we performed the same regressions by using a sample of 166 firms (87+79) over 8 years, which resulted in 1,328 observations. The control sample average size and age are equal to USD 2,469,300 and 14 years respectively, very similar to our initial sample data. We show the results of these estimations in Table 6 , Models 1-4, using only PATENT for simplicity (but the results are similar for all the patent specifications). Table 6 confirms our earlier findings. The main exception is that patents are now significant and positive in the product equations as well. This only confirms that our initial sampling method is correct: with no-patent firms in the sample, patents still capture an innovation effect. We will discuss this point further in the next section.
[TABLES 6 ABOUT HERE]
5 The LECG software database was obtained from CorpTech (Corporate Technology Information Services), and it provides information on more than 15,000 software companies active in the US. The LECG dataset reports whether a firm has ever been active in a certain business segment of the software industry, in our case Security Software. For more details on the LECG-CorpTech dataset see Lerner and Zhu (2005) .
Finally, we performed the same regressions with the original sample of 87 firms but without the five largest firms (first quintile of size distribution). This checks whether our results are driven by some outlier observations. The results, shown in Table 6 , Models 5-8, are very similar to those for the 87 firm sample.
Discussion
Patents
This is one of the first studies that show how patents support technology trade. Our claim is that patent stocks capture something more than a pure innovation effect. In our view more patents means fewer transaction costs both for the supplier -innovation protection -and for the buyerfewer search costs. Algorithm technology is a complex innovation, and most firms, particularly the start-ups, have just one or few algorithms. Therefore, the discontinuity of the innovation event means that patents tend to increase more than proportionally with the number of algorithms. The first patent accounts for the development of a new algorithm, while additional patents reflect factors other than the sheer number of innovations.
Our initial sampling method eliminates part of the innovation effect associated with patents. We cannot be sure that the firms with no-patents have not developed an algorithm; however, we know that the firms with patents are quite likely to have one. So, with a sample of firms with patented technologies, the number of patents is more likely to reflect other aspects than the sheer number of innovations. In this respect, beyond the control of firm R&D, age and size, patents affect only licensing, and not product launching. Our interpretation is straightforward. If patents are measuring IPR protection or innovation visibility, they do not raise significantly the odds of a product innovation -beyond our controls. On the contrary, they increase the probability of licensing an algorithm. When we employ a firm sample with or without patents, patent variables gain importance as a measure of innovation. As a result, not only are patents important for licensing, but they also raise the probability of launching a new product. In sum, SSI firms need an innovation to launch a product or to sell a technology.
However, for the product strategy they could buy innovations from third parties and use other tools rather than patents to block rivalry, while for the licensing strategy they need patents to lower transaction costs. 6 Also, we cannot exclude that patents help firms extract more rents from their products.
Industry scenario
Our data confirm the predictions of Scenario 1. The industry is young with no-shake-out, at least so far. Because of its fragmented downstream co-specialized assets, market niches proliferate and patents encourage technology sale. Downstream co-specialized assets are important for operating in final markets, but because of their fragmentation there are weak threats of business cannibalization that could influence the propensity to license.
In addition, not only is SSI segmented in at least six major product niches dominated by different specialized firms (mostly young start-ups), but the demand structure in SSI also reflects two distinct types of customers. On the one hand, there are large ICT firms that represent technology-skilled, highly-selective customers that choose the best products on the market (hardware, telecommunication, and semiconductor producers). On the other hand, we have technologically less sophisticated customers like banks, financial institutions and credit cards that demand global security packages (Giarratana 2004; Fosfuri and Giarratana 2006) .
Thus, we can identify two types of producers and sellers of SSI products. The first type is firms specialized in niches that release innovative products in only one niche and that are typically sellers of algorithms (RSA Data Security, Verisign, Certicom, Check Point Software).
The second type is more service-oriented firms that create diversified portfolios of security products serving the less technologically advanced customers with a global security demand.
Thus, the route of success for a start-up is to enter and specialize in a particular sub-market niche trying to remain at the innovation frontier in that niche and investing in downstream assets that, being niche-specific, are not very costly and can be defended easily. Start-ups could also increase their revenues and reputation by selling their technology to firms specialized in other niches or to large incumbents, which own diversified product portfolios and can sell to customers that the start-ups will rarely be able to reach (e.g. banks and financial institutions). In unreported regressions, if we introduce the number of licensing contracts signed as a technology buyer to explain the probability of releasing a product, the sign of this covariate is positive and significant, while all other variable signs and standard errors remain largely similar.
Finally, for firms with a patented innovation, patents increase the probability of licensing the inventions, but they do not have a clear effect on entry in downstream markets. This is because, when markets for technology are well-functioning, like in SSI, firms with no innovations can buy them from third parties and embed them in proprietary products. Therefore, patent effectiveness, which allows for a good functioning of this market for technology, is also the source of segmentation of the downstream product market. This is because the firms without innovations can buy them and serve market niches that would otherwise remain unexploited.
Conclusions
This paper tried to develop the theoretical framework that supports the firm decision of commercially exploiting innovations. In this respect, we try to improve on the current literature (Teece 1986; Arora et al. 2001; Gans et al. 2002; Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006) by developing a more comprehensive framework in which the choice to launch a product or to license a technology are predicted from different combinations of patent importance and nature of downstream co-specialized assets. In our theory section, we merge two literature traditions: the studies on the role of IPRs and downstream co-specialized assets (Gans and Stern 2003; Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Fosfuri 2007) , and the industrial organization contributions on industry evolution (Thomspon and Klepper 2007) . Given that downstream co-specialized assets can be either homogeneous or fragmented in several sub-market niches, typically according to the stage of industry evolution, we defined four scenarios in which the control of downstream assets and the firm propensity to patent could produce alternative effects on the probability of selling a disembodied technology or releasing a product in the final market.
To our knowledge, together with Gans et al. (2002) , this is one of the first attempts to collect data on both technology licensing and products from existing databases in order to jointly test hypotheses about company behavior on these matters. We tested our predictions using data on the Security Software Industry. This is a new industry that has not featured an industrial shake-out, and it is characterized by proliferation of market niches and important functions of patents. Our findings confirm that downstream assets are pivotal in the final market penetration, but have no effect on the licensing probability. Conversely, patents increase the firm probability of selling technology, but do not have a clear effect on entry in final market.
Our results are useful to both managers -especially technology entrepreneurs -and policy makers. For managers, we show that firms should seriously consider the alternative options of selling technology and not just final products. This could help in particular the young ventures that may increase their revenues and chance of survival. As a matter of fact, most Security Software firms patent cryptography inventions without considering the business potential of markets for technology. From the interviews that we conducted we found that the market for technology was a demand-pull event, initiated by large incumbents who seek for algorithms owned by small ventures. A more structured strategic thinking about how firms could profit from innovation in the market for products and technologies could not only encourage more technology sales, but also increase substantially the effectiveness of firm investments in R&D and patents. For example, firms may not invest in innovation because they do not have the downstream assets to incorporate the innovation in final products. But if they consider technology licensing, they may do so even if they do not own such assets.
Our main suggestion for policy makers is that the effectiveness of patent regimes should be adapted to industrial downstream conditions. We have shown that patents could be really important in markets that tend to be highly segmented. These are usually general purpose industries that produce products with several end-use applications and characterized by a proliferation of sub-market niches (i.e. lasers or semiconductors). In these industries, wherein the control of downstream assets is spread across several organizations, technology deals can facilitate the quick exploitation of many market niches and they can make it possible to reach many customers. High transaction costs in technology deals, possibly produced by an imperfect patent regime, could especially harm the development of these markets. We do not know if SSI could have experienced the evolution trajectory that we have described if patentability in software had not gone through its reforms of the 1980s. Needless to say, patent reinforcement and effectiveness could play a different role in industries where downstream assets are homogenous and oligopolistic forces prevail. In this respect, our key conclusion is that in order to assess the implications of stronger patents one needs to assess carefully the nature of downstream product markets and more generally industry structure and the stage of life cycle in which the industry is in. Hopefully, our Scenarios have helped provide some keys to understanding these different implications. 
